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Prior research indicates that time perspective (TP; views of past, present, and future)
is related to decision-making style. By contrast, no prior study considered relations
between TP and decision-making competence. We therefore investigated associations
between dimensions of the Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (S-ZTPI) and
performance on the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) battery in a sample
of older adults (60–90 years, N = 346). A structural equation model involving four
A-DMC components as indicators of a general DMC factor and the six TP dimensions
as the predictors revealed a significant negative association between the Present
Fatalistic dimension and DMC. Given that age-related differences were apparent in
DMC and that Present Fatalistic orientation increased with age, we tested a model by
which the age-related differences in DMC were mediated by age-related differences in
Present Fatalistic attitudes and in working memory. The results were consistent with
full mediation of the age effects, with Present Fatalistic and working memory jointly
accounting for a substantial amount of the variance in DMC (51%). The finding that
DMC among older adults, in particular more cognitively demanding aspects such as
applying decision rules, can be undermined by increased present fatalistic attitudes and
declines in working memory is discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks highlighting
the contribution of both motivational and cognitive factors to effective decision making.
Keywords: time perspective, decision-making competence, decision making, working memory, older adults
INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have seen an increased interest in individual differences in decision making and
in the individual features contributing to better decision outcomes (see, e.g., Stanovich and West,
1998; Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007). Older adults represent a group of particular interest in this
regard, motivated by global population aging (Kinsella and He, 2008). Reviews of the literature and
theoretical models (Strough et al., 2015a,b) suggest that older adults’ motivation to put effort into
the decision-making process changes with age and depends on several factors, including perceived
personal relevance of decisions, maintenance of positive emotions growing more relevant with
age (Carstensen, 2006), and confidence in applying ability and knowledge. This holds beyond the
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ascertained role of cognitive abilities like memory skills
and fluid reasoning (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012;
Del Missier et al., 2015).
Two different aspects of decision making need to be
distinguished: decision-making competence and decision-
making style (Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007). Decision-making
competence refers to effective decision making as reflected
by performance measures of accuracy and consistency of the
decisions, evaluated in relation to normative criteria (see also
Parker and Fischhoff, 2005). Decision-making styles, by contrast,
refer to habitual approaches to and handling of situations
that involve decision making. Measures from the two domains
showed some significant intercorrelations (Bavol’ár and Orosová,
2015), but were also shown to account for unique variance in
decision-making outcomes (Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007).
Importantly, measures of both competence and style have been
found to be related to indicators of real-life decision-making
success (Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007; Dewberry et al., 2013;
Wood and Highhouse, 2014).
A significant stream of research on individual differences
in DMC has risen from the development of performance-
based measurement instruments (e.g., Bruine de Bruine et al.,
2007; Finucane and Gullion, 2010; Parker and Fischhoff, 2005).
These studies showed that individual differences in DMC are
stable over time (Parker et al., 2018) and related to individual
differences in fluid and crystallized cognitive abilities, although
the strength of these relations depends on the type of DMC
tasks considered (Del Missier et al., 2012, 2013) and DMC
tasks more related to fluid abilities, working memory, and
executive functioning seem to show a greater age-related decline
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012; Del Missier et al., 2012, 2017;
for reviews, see also Del Missier et al., 2015; Strough et al.,
2015b). As concerns the relation between individual differences
in DMC and indicators of real-life decision-making success,
some studies showed significant associations between DMC
scores and reported negative life decision outcomes (Bruine
de Bruine et al., 2007; Parker et al., 2015) or risky and
antisocial behaviors (Parker et al., 2018), with higher DMC scores
being associated with better life decision outcomes and more
constructive behavior.
The aim of this study was to examine older adults’ decision-
making competence in relation to a cognitive factor deemed to
be particularly crucial to efficient DMC performance in more
demanding tasks (Del Missier et al., 2015), namely, working
memory (i.e., the capacity for simultaneous processing and
storage of information in memory) and the individual’s habitual
view of the past, present, and future, known as time perspective
(TP). TP has been conceived as a semi-conscious process in
which the three temporal frames (past, present, and future) play
a central role in the relationship between personal and social
experiences (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). A basic assumption of
this framework is that temporal biases in the form of an over-
focus on, or overly aversive attitude toward, some of the frames
and attitudes (e.g., a negative attitude toward the past) develop
habitually. Once these temporal attitudes have developed, they
act as dispositional factors predictive of how an individual will
respond across a variety of daily life behaviors and choices
(i.e., a trait; recent frameworks making a distinction between TP
as a trait and state; Stolarski et al., 2018).
To operationalize TP, Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) developed
the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI). ZTPI
comprises five subscales, two for each time frame, except Future,
which was reflected by a single (mainly positive) scale. Past
Positive captures a warm, positive, and nostalgic view of the past.
Past Negative, by contrast, reflects a negative and aversive view of
the past. The scales involving relations to the present time frame
distinguish a live-for-the-moment attitude involving immediate
pleasure seeking without much concern of future consequences
labeled as Present Hedonistic and Present Fatalistic. Present
Fatalistic reflects a hopeless and helpless attitude toward the
present. Finally, the subscale called Future captures a broad
future orientation that reflects optimism, planning, and striving
for future rewards. An increasing number of studies also
considered a measure known as Deviations from a Balanced
Time Perspective (DBTP; Stolarski et al., 2011; Rönnlund et al.,
2017) that takes into account deviations from a proposed ideal, or
balanced, TP (Zimbardo and Boyd, 2008), across all of the ZTPI
subscales. There is abundant empirical evidence supporting the
notion that individual differences in TP as reflected by ZTPI are
predictive of a broad set of behavioral and psychological outcome
variables (see Stolarski et al., 2015; Kostic and Chadee, 2017).
Available evidence regarding the relationship between TP
and decision making was to our knowledge restricted to few
studies mainly in the area of propensity for risk-related decision
(Jochemczyk et al., 2017) and career decision making (Walker
and Tracey, 2012; Jung et al., 2015). Only more recently, TP
has been investigated in relation to a more general aspect of
decision making, but focusing on decision-making style, i.e., “. . .
the learned, habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual
when confronted with a decision situation” (Scott and Bruce,
1995, p. 820). Under the assumption that individuals may be
characterized by their particular profile across a select number of
styles, Scott and Bruce developed the General Decision Making
Style questionnaire (GDMS). GDMS involves five styles: rational
(systematic and extensive evaluation of options), intuitive
(relying on hunches and emotions), spontaneous (impulsivity of
decisions), dependent (to seek advice and support of others), and
avoidant (to avoid decision whenever possible).
Carelli et al. (2011) showed several associations between
the separate GDMS and TP dimensions. Specifically, a rational
style was positively associated with scores on Future/Future
Positive (r = 0.48/0.45), while the intuitive style was associated
with higher scores on Past Positive, Present Fatalistic, and
Present Hedonistic (r values: 0.33–0.35). The spontaneous style
was related to higher Past Negative and Present Fatalistic. In
turn, a dependent style was related to higher scores on Past
Negative as well as Future Negative, as were scores on the
scale reflecting the avoidant style. Similar associations between
GDMS dimensions and TP dimensions were observed in a study
involving an adolescent/student sample by Molinari et al. (2016).
Thus, individuals scoring high on the negative temporal frame
(Past/Future Negative) may tend to adopt a decision style that
is avoidant and dependent. On the contrary, individuals who
are more present focused tend to adopt a more intuitive and
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spontaneous decision style, while a rational style is associated
with being more future oriented.
Aims and Hypotheses of the Present
Study
In the present study, we aim to extend the limited existing
literature on the relation between aging, TP, and decision making
by focusing specifically on decision-making competence. We
start from the view that both a proper motivational approach
to the task (Strough et al., 2015b) and an adequate cognitive
ability (in particular working memory: Del Missier et al., 2013;
Del Missier et al., 2017) are needed to achieve a good decision-
making performance in cognitively challenging DMC tasks.
Existing research showed that a Present Fatalistic TP is related
to a less structured and analytic approach to decision making
(Carelli et al., 2011; see also Baumann and Odum, 2012).
This fact possibly reflects lower motivation individuals with
a Present Fatatlistic TP as other studies linked this TP with
lower motivation (e.g., Stanescu and Iorga, 2015; Zajenkowski
et al., 2016a). For example, a strong negative correlation between
Present Fatalistic and a measure of achievement motivation
(Stanescu and Iorga, 2015) was observed. Finally, aging is
associated both with increased Present Fatalistic time orientation
(Rönnlund et al., 2017) and with decreased working memory
performance (e.g., Park et al., 2002; Del Missier et al., 2013,
2017). Building on this knowledge, we expect that the age-
related decrease in decision-making competence observed in
previous studies (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012; Del Missier
et al., 2017; Rosi et al., 2019) will be been mediated both by
age-related differences in Present Fatalistic time orientation,
reflecting lower task-oriented motivation, and by age-related
differences in working memory.
Therefore, our hypotheses for the present study were as
follows: age will be negatively associated with DMC performance
and with working memory performance, but positively associated
with Present Fatalistic. Moreover, participants with a more
Present Fatalistic TP will score lower on DMC tests (due to their
less proactive and structured approach to the decision tasks)
and participants with lower working memory performance will
also show a lower DMC performance (due to the functional
support of working memory to cognitively challenging DMC
tasks). Finally, we expect that age-related differences in DMC
will be at least partially mediated by age-related differences in
both Present Fatalistic time orientation and working memory.
For what concerns the relation between TP and working
memory, we expect to find a negative association between
Present Fatalistic and working memory, following up previous
research showing relations between Present Fatalistic and various
higher-order cognitive functions closely related to working
memory, including general cognitive ability (Rönnlund and
Carelli, 2018a), fluid intelligence (Zajenkowski et al., 2016a,b),
and working memory updating (Witowska and Zajenkowski,
2019). To examine the possibility that other TP dimensions
contribute to efficient DMC, we considered the other ZTPI
[Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (S-ZTPI); Carelli
et al., 2011] dimensions as well together with a measure capturing
TP biases across all of the dimensions (DBTP; Stolarski et al.,
2011; Rönnlund et al., 2017).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Our sample was composed of 346 Swedish adults ranging in age
from 60 to 90 years (M = 70.2, SD = 4.4), including 138 adults
aged 60–65 years, 145 aged 70–75, and 133 aged 75 or older. There
were 167 males and 179 females in the sample. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants and the study was approved by
the regional ethical review board in Umeå.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were screened for dementia, sensory mental
retardation, sensory impairments, and a native tongue other
than Swedish (for further details concerning sampling and
inclusion, see Nilsson et al., 1997, 2004; Nyström et al., 2019).
The participants underwent a health assessment session and
a cognitive testing session in two different days, 1 week
apart. A paper-and-pencil version of the ZTPI was given to
the participants at the end of the health assessment. The
questionnaire was completed at home and was returned at the
cognitive testing session. Participants completed the Swedish
version of the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC)
tasks and other measures at home. They were provided with
detailed written instructions and examples for each task, and
they completed the A-DMC tasks alone and without external aids
following the pre-specified task order.
Adult Decision-Making Competence
The A-DMC battery1 was developed to capture the skills central
to normative theories of decision making (Parker and Fischhoff,
2005; Bruine de Bruine et al., 2007). The A-DMC originally
included six scales. Data on four of the scales were collected
in the present study: Resistance to Framing, Recognizing Social
Norms, Applying Decision Rules, and Resistance to Sunk Costs. The
scales Under/Overconfidence and Consistency in Risk Perception
had not been included as part of the battery due to inconsistent
findings in other studies in different countries in relation to
their age-related changes and to the practical need to keep the
data collection constrained. Resistance to Framing employs risky
framing and attribute framing problems (Levin et al., 1998)
to measure whether participants’ preferences are affected by
normatively irrelevant variations in how options are described
(e.g., ground beef described as either as “20% fat” or as “80%
lean”). Fourteen item pairs are presented in two sets, with one
containing the positive/gain member of each pair, and the other
containing the corresponding negative/loss items. Performance is
assessed with a score reflecting the participant’s ability to avoid
being swayed by the superficial presentation of the problem
(with higher scores associated to greater resistance to framing).
Recognizing Social Norms asks “out of 100 people your age, how
many would say it is sometimes OK” to engage in each of 16
1http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Adult_-_Decision_Making_Competence.html
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2038
fpsyg-10-02038 September 11, 2019 Time: 16:33 # 4
Rönnlund et al. Time Perspective and Decision Making
undesirable behaviors (e.g., “steal under certain circumstances”).
These perceived social norms are compared to the percent of
respondents from the study who had reported earlier that “it
is sometimes OK” to engage in each behavior (actual social
norms of the group). Each participant’s score is the within-
subject correlation between judged norms and observed norms.
A higher score is associated to a better perception of social norms.
Applying Decision Rules assesses the ability to apply specified
decision rules (e.g., elimination by aspects, lexicographic) to
10 hypothetical choices, with each option characterized on
several attributes in a table. Performance is assessed by the
proportion of decision problems correctly solved via an errorless
application of the prescribed decision rules. Resistance to Sunk
Costs involves 10 sunk cost problems to assess the ability to ignore
prior investments that are irrecoverable (sunk cost options)
and consider only future consequences (better future options)
when making decisions. A higher score in this task is associated
with a greater resistance to sunk costs. Estimates of reliability
for the components in studies using the Swedish version of
the A-DMC (Del Missier et al., 2013) were as follows: 0.59
for Resistance to Framing, 0.83 for Applying Decision Rules,
0.78/0.90 (self/others) for Recognizing Social Norms, and 0.48 for
Resistance to Sunk Costs.
Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory
Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory was used to assess
TP. S-ZTPI (Carelli et al., 2011) consists of 64 items, each of
which reflects one of six dimensions: Past Negative (e.g., “Painful
past experiences keep being replayed in my mind”), Past Positive
(e.g., “Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells often bring back
a flood of wonderful memories”), Present Fatalistic (e.g., “Fate
determines much in my life”), Present Hedonistic (e.g., “I believe
that getting together with one’s friends to party is one of life’s
important pleasure”), Future Negative (e.g., “To think about my
future makes me sad”), and Future Positive (e.g., When I want
to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means for
reaching those goals”). The participant is requested to rate how
characteristic each of the statements is of his/her own view on
five-point Likert scale, ranging from very uncharacteristic (coded
1) to very characteristic (coded as 5). The S-ZTPI differs from
the original in that it differentiates positive and negative aspects
of the future TP by adding (eight) new items to inventory for
the Future Negative scale. Future Negative reflects a broadly
aversive view of the future. This distinction between Future
Positive and Future Negative has been supported by several
recent studies showing differential associations of the two future
scales with perceived stress (Rönnlund et al., 2018), coping styles
(Blomgren et al., 2016), well-being (Rönnlund et al., 2017),
and sleep quality (Rönnlund and Carelli, 2018b). Confirmatory
factor analyses provided support of the six-factor version and
internal consistencies ranged from 0.65 to 0.94 across subscales
(Carelli et al., 2011).
To capture TP biases across all the TP dimensions, we
additionally considered the measure known as Deviations from
a Balanced TP (DBTP) developed by Stolarski et al. (2011)
and revised by Rönnlund et al. (2017; i.e., to take into
account the Future Positive/Negative Distinction). DBTP was
computed according to the formula (Stolarski et al., 2011;
Rönnlund et al., 2017):
√
(oPN − ePN)2 + (oPP − ePP)2 + (oPF − ePF)2 +
(oPH − ePH)2 + (oFP − eFP)2 + (oFN − eFN)2,
where o = optimal score and e = empirical (i.e., observed)
score. In accord with previous studies (Stolarski et al., 2011;
Rönnlund et al., 2017), optimal scores were set to the following:
oPN = 1.95, oPP = 4.6, oPF = 1.5, oPH = 3.9, oF/oFP = 4.0, and
oFN = 1.8.
Working Memory
We employed two measures previously used as indicators of
working memory in the Betula project (Del Missier et al., 2017).
The first was the 2-back task, a computerized version of the
n-back paradigm used to assess the ability to update working
memory contents (e.g., Owen et al., 2005). In this version of the
task, 40 words are shown one after the other and the participants
are required to keep in memory the most recent ones and their
temporal order and to indicate whether the current word is the
same as the one presented two items earlier or not by pressing
two designated keys. The task is preceded by two rounds of
15 practice items. The performance score was the proportion
of correct responses. The second measure used as a proxy for
working memory was the WAIS-R Block Design test. This test
involves the manipulation of cubes to match a series of patterns
(provided on pictures) and was administered in accordance with
the WAIS-R-manual (Wechsler, 1981). Raw scores were used
as performance measure. Performance in this test proved to be
strongly and selectively related to working memory updating
(Friedman et al., 2006), consistently with other findings that
showed a strong relation between working memory capacity and
fluid intelligence (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1990; Engle et al., 1999;
Kane et al., 2005). The 2-back reliability was 0.76 (Del Missier
et al., 2017), while the Block design 5-year reliability was 0.81
(Rönnlund and Nilsson, 2006 – 5-year stability).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of the measures examined in the present
study, including decision-making competence, TP, and working
memory, are provided in Table 1. The intercorrelations of the
measures of DMC, TP, and WM are presented in Table 2.
In the first step of the data analysis, we set out to examine
the extent to which the TP dimensions were (uniquely) related
to a general decision-making competence factor (Weller et al.,
2018). Toward this aim, we tested a model where the four
individual A-DMC components loaded on a single factor with the
six TP dimensions as the predictors. Given prior demonstrations
that some TP dimension showed significant correlations with
age (r = 0.24, p < 0.001 for Present Fatalistic and r = 0.15,
p < 0.01 for Future Negative in the present sample confirmed
such associations) as was the measure of DBTP (r = 0.14, p = 0.01
in the present sample), age was controlled for in the analyses.
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The TP dimensions were allowed to correlate. Even though the
strength of the loadings varied considerably (0.15–0.85; see also
Weller et al., 2018), each of the A-DMC components showed
significant loading on the DCM factor. The model showed good
fit, χ2(23) = 23.96, χ2/df = 1.042, CFI = 0.998, RMSEA = 0.011.
The basic model with values for paths/loadings is depicted
in Figure 1.
Present Fatalistic was a highly significant predictor of DMC
(β = -0.33, p< 0.001). None of the other S-ZTPI dimensions were
uniquely associated with the latent DMC factor. Provided that
Present Fatalistic was positively associated with age (r = -0.24)
and negatively related to working memory measures (r = -0.24
and r = -0.26, with Block Design and 2-back, respectively), we
next considered a model by which the expected negative effect
of age on the DMC factor was mediated both by an age-related
increase in Present Fatalistic and by an age-related decrease in
working memory capacity.
In this model, each of the nine individual S-ZTPI items
reflecting Present Fatalistic was included as separate indicators
of a latent (Present Fatalistic) factor. The two cognitive
measures (2-back, Block Design) served as indicators of a
latent Working Memory factor. As in the previous analyses,
the four DMC components were, finally, included as indicators
of a latent DMC factor. Finally, the two cognitive measures
(2-back, Block Design) served as indicators of a latent
Working Memory factor.
To obtain tests of indirect effects and to obtain bias-corrected
(95%) confidence intervals (BCIs) for the estimates, we used
bootstrapping, involving 1000 bootstrap samples. This method
requires complete data. We therefore used a regression-based
approach to impute missing values on the cognitive measures (see
Table 1). The imputation procedure had virtually no effect on
FIGURE 1 | Structural equation model with the six S-ZTI dimension as the
predictors of a latent DCM variable. Values are standardized coefficients. Pos,
Positive; Neg, Negative; RTF, Resistance to Framing; ADR, Applying Decision
Rules; RSN, Recognizing Social Norms; RSC, Resistance to Sunk Costs.
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of the measures included in the study.
Measure N M SD Min Max
A-DMC – RTF 346 3.82 0.58 1.79 5.00
A-DMC – ADR 346 0.71 0.19 0.00 1.00
A-DMC – RSN 346 0.55 0.22 −0.40 0.94
A-DMC – RSC 346 4.62 0.66 2.50 6.00
S-ZTPI – Past Negative 346 2.25 0.59 1.10 4.30
S-ZTPI – Past Positive 346 3.57 0.52 1.33 5.00
S-ZTPI – Present Fatalistic 346 2.47 0.53 1.00 4.22
S-ZTPI – Present Hedonistic 346 2.87 0.45 1.56 4.53
S-ZTPI – Future Negative 346 2.49 0.55 1.11 4.20
S-ZTPI – Future Positive 346 3.28 0.43 1.82 4.55
DBTP 346 2.32 0.55 0.99 4.79
WM – Block Design 345 26.60 9.16 4 49
WM – 2-back 308 0.82 0.10 0.18 1.00
A-DMC, Adult Decision Making Competence; RTF, Resistance to Framing; ADR,
Applying Decision Rules; RSN, Recognizing Social Norms; RSC, Resistance
to Sunk Costs; S-ZTPI, Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory; DBTP,
Deviations from a Balanced Time Perspective; WM, working memory.
the β-values (analyses based on participants with complete data
showed a highly similar result). A summary of the model and the
results (β-values for the paths) is shown in Figure 2.
The model fit was good, χ2(99) = 183.37, χ2/df = 1.852,
CFI = 0.903, RMSEA = 0.05. The results confirmed a substantial
total effect of age on DMC (β = -0.45, 95% BCI: -0.57 to -0.33),
and a significant indirect effect of age on DMC (β = -0.42, 95%
BCI: -0.61 to -0.27) but no direct effect of age on DMC (β = -
0.03, 95% BCI = -0.21 to 0.18) with a ratio of indirect to total
effect of 0.93. The links from age to WM (β = -0.65), from age to
Present Fatalistic (β = 0.33), and from WM and Present Fatalistic
to DMC (-0.48, -0.31) were all highly significant. Thus, the results
provided support for full mediation of the effects of age on DMC.
In order to examine the possibility that cohort differences in
education (years of schooling) biased the foregoing estimates,
a second model was run in which this factor was controlled
for. Inclusion of this factor did not change the presence or
absence of any of the foregoing effects supporting the robustness
of the findings obtained. Finally, the fact that the loadings
of the individual A-DMC components on the general DMC
factor varied considerably may suggest that analyses should be
performed at the level of separate A-DMC components. Such
analyses revealed significant age associations (p < 0.05) for three
of the individual A-DMC components: Applying Decision Rules
(β = -0.36), Resistance to Framing (β = -0.12), and Recognizing
Social Norms (β = -0.21), two of which were significantly related
to Present Fatalistic as well as working memory (see Table 2).
However, only for ADR was the pattern of full mediation of
age effects together with a significant (unique) association with
Present Fatalistic (cf. Figure 2) observed.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined relations between TP and decision-
making competence in an older sample. The results confirmed
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FIGURE 2 | Relationship between age and latent-level decision making competence (DMC) variable with Present Fatalistic and working memory (WM) as mediators
of the effect. a and b are direct effects. c is the total effect of age, c’ is the direct effect of age controlling for Present Fatalistic and working memory. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Zero-order correlations of the measures in the study.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
(1) A-DMC – RTF 1
(2) A-DMC – ADR 0.23∗∗ 1
(3) A-DMC – RSN 0.18∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 1
(4) A-DMC – RSC 0.00 0.15∗∗ 0.08 1
(5) SZTPI – Past Negative −0.07 −0.21∗∗ −0.05 0.00 1
(6) SZTPI – Past Positive −0.05 0.04 −0.08 0.04 −0.21∗∗ 1
(7) S-ZTPI – Pres Fatalistic −0.07 −0.36∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.07 0.37∗∗ 0.08 1
(8) S-ZTPI – Pres Hedonistic −0.02 −0.08 −0.13∗ 0.03 0.17∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 1
(9) S-ZTPI – Future Negative 0.00 −0.10 −0.03 −0.04 0.64∗∗ −0.06 0.40∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 1
(10) S-ZTPI – Future Positive 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.18∗∗ 0.13∗ −0.08 0.00 0.34∗∗ 1
(11) DBTP −0.05 −0.29∗∗ −0.07 −0.09 0.55∗∗ −0.57∗∗ 0.49∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.45∗∗ −0.20∗∗ 1
(12) WM – Block Design 0.23∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.04 −0.16∗∗ 0.02 −0.24∗∗ −0.02 −0.07 0.05 −0.20∗∗ 1
(13) WM – 2-back 0.12∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.01 −0.14∗ −0.04 −0.26∗∗ 0.03 −0.11∗ −0.05 −0.19∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 1
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. A-DMC, Adult Decision-Making Competence; RTF, Resistance to Framing; ADR, Applying Decision Rules; RSN, Recognizing Social
Norms; RSC, Resistance to Sunk Costs; S-ZTPI,Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory; DBTP, Deviations from a Balanced Time Perspective; Pres, Present;
WM, Working Memory.
a significant relationship between one of the TP dimensions,
Present Fatalistic, and a general DMC factor. The selective
relationship between this particular facet of TP and DMC is
noteworthy, in that Present Fatalistic accounted for variance
in a general DMC factor over and beyond working memory,
which was already established as a major factor contributing
to effective decision making (Del Missier et al., 2013, 2017)
in particular for more demanding DMC components such as
Applying Decision Rules. In total, the two factors accounted for
a little more than half of the variance in DMC, which is rather
substantial. Additionally, in agreement with our predictions
based on studies involving related cognitive measures (e.g.,
Zajenkowski et al., 2016a,b; Rönnlund et al., 2018; Witowska
and Zajenkowski, 2019), we observed a significant association
between a latent working memory variable and a latent Present
Fatalistic variable over and beyond age. More generally, the
data were consistent with a model by which the negative
age effect on a general DMC factor is mediated by age-
related decreases in working memory and increased present
fatalistic attitudes.
Theoretical frameworks posit that, in addition to effective
cognitive processing, rational decision making requires an
appropriate motivational orientation to the task (Strough et al.,
2015b, see also Bruine de Bruine et al., 2015). It appears
reasonable to consider motivational factors to account for
the link between Present Fatalistic and DMC. Being focused
on the present in the fatalistic sense should undermine
motivation to carry out cognitively demanding tasks, as
control of future consequences and outcomes of behavior are
regarded as out of own control. This should entail lower
levels of self-efficacy (see Boniwell et al., 2010; Zebardast
et al., 2011; Zajenkowski et al., 2016a,b) and a less proactive
and organized approach to the task (Carelli et al., 2011,
see also Baumann and Odum, 2012). Lower self-efficacy in
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the decision-making competence domain, or more generally,
could possibly hamper performance in cognitively demanding
decision-making tasks. In a related vein, it could be that
those who are more present fatalistic are more selective in
regard to what tasks they invest effort, devaluing decision-
making tasks lacking in terms of direct personal relevance,
an age-related motivational constraint that has been suggested
to contribute to poorer DMC in older adults more generally
(Löckenhoff and Carstensen, 2007; Hess et al., 2015). Indeed,
recent studies support the notion that age-related changes in
motivation can affect the older adults’ effort to make decisions
(Bruine de Bruine et al., 2015; Strough et al., 2015a). At
this point, it is warranted to point out that even though we
found support of a general DMC factor, the loadings of the
individual tasks varied considerably (see also Weller et al.,
2018) and the most cognitively demanding factor (Applying
Decision Rules) with the highest loading on the latent facto
was likely the main driver of the associations with age and
Present Fatalistic.
Rönnlund et al. (2017) (see also Desmyter and De Raedt,
2012) found a clear age-related increase in Present Fatalistic,
while Past Positive, Present Hedonistic, and Future Positive
were relatively stable across age. A key concept in trying to
explain the present fatalistic age bias in old age is “locus of
control,” defined as individuals’ beliefs about how personal
actions, chance, and powerful others determine life events
and circumstances (Levenson, 1973). Individuals who attribute
their life circumstances to external resources such as fate –
as in present fatalistic TP – are unlikely to plan for the
future (Shipp et al., 2009). Higher external locus of control,
in contrast to “internal locus of control” – individuals who
believe that their life circumstances result from their own
behavior (Rotter, 1966) – is often reported in old age (e.g.,
Caplan and Schooler, 2003). This shift toward an external
locus of control/Present Fatalistic in late senescence could, in
part, stem from physical and cognitive impairments (Lachman,
1986; Rönnlund et al., 2017; Rönnlund and Carelli, 2018a).
Hence, it is possible that lower levels of cognitive functioning
are a forerunner of higher levels of Present Fatalistic. In
particular, lower cognitive flexibility could make an individual
more likely to “get stuck” in a particular TP bias, such as
a Present Fatalistic TP bias (e.g., Zajenkowski et al., 2016b).
However, a reversed causal influence (i.e., from locus of
control/PF to cognitive task performance) is additionally worth
considering (e.g., Zajenkowski et al., 2016a,b) and the present
finding of a link between Present Fatalistic and DMC over
and beyond variations in working memory ability indicates a
need to consider such influences in the context of decision-
making performance.
From a broader perspective, our findings seem consistent with
the socio-emotional selectivity theory (SST, Carstensen et al.,
1999; Carstensen, 2006), according to which the perception of
time plays a fundamental role in the selection and pursuit of
social goals, with important implications for emotion, cognition,
and motivation. In old age, we tend to perceive our time
horizons as limited and to be more present-time oriented, thus
to prioritize personally relevant and proximal socio-emotional
goals and related tasks (i.e., spending time with familiars and
social partners).
Limitations and Future Research
Directions
Even though the present study had advantages that might be
deserved to be highlighted, including comprehensive measures
of the constructs, a reasonably large population-based sample,
and strong reported effects, our investigation has its limitations.
Of primary concern, the study design was cross-sectional. Even
though tests of mediational models based on cross-sectional data
can provide a check of the consistency of theoretical models,
and even if we controlled for the potential role of education,
longitudinal data are required to provide an evaluation of
causal relationships among the variables. Additionally, future
studies are needed to further clarify the relation between Present
Fatalistic and motivational factors in determining DMC in older
adults, given that we did not directly measure motivation to
perform DMC tasks. In this context, it will be of interest also
to see the extent to which particular devices, instructions, or
training procedure can be used to minimize age differences in
(demanding) aspects of DMC. The meta-cognition framework by
Stolarski and Witowska (2017) seems to suggest that procedures
aimed to increase temporal–metacognitive skills (or maintenance
of such skills) in older adults might reduce TP biases, hence
allowing for more efficient DMC. Future studies also needed to
determine the extent to which the present associations generalize
across age or whether the observed link between Present
Fatalistic and DMC is particularly evident in older samples.
Although our study provides a first significant contribution to the
investigation of the relationships between age, time orientation,
and cognitive abilities in decision-making competence, further
research is needed to fully elucidate the intriguing network
of relationships between these significant constructs that we
started to unveil.
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